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ABSTRACT.  Like  many of  his contemporaries,  Lieutenant  Bedford  Pim, of the  Royal  Navy, believed in  the existence of an “open  polar sea” beyond 
a zone of coastal  ice  around  the  margins  of  the  Arctic Oean. On the basis of this, in fall 1851  he  postulated that Sir John  Franklin’s  expedition had 
sailed north through  Wellington  Channel  and  then set a  course across the ‘‘Polar Sea” directly for Bering Strait, but  had  then  become  entangled  in  an 
ice-bound chain of islands  extending  from  what are now the  Canadian  Arctic  Islands to the  vicinity  of Ostrov Vrangel’ya.  Having  been  refused 
Admiralty  approval For his plan to mount a small overland expedition to  Chukotka,  from  whence he proposed  to  push north across the sea ice  in 
search of Franklin’s  ships, Pim was able to  gain the support of Lady  Franklin  and the Royal  Geographical Society. He  travelled to St. Petersburg  in 
December. 185 1 but after considerable  delay was refused  permission by the Russian  authorities  to  proceed farther east. The main  stated  reason for this 
refusal was that the Russians had somehow  translated  Pim’s  plans  for  a  small  expedition  of tw  or three men into an operation  that  would  necessitate 
1200-1500  sledge  dogs;  it was anticipated that  such an operation would  seriously  disrupt  the  economy  of  the  Kolyma  basin  and cause real  hardship  to 
the  local  people.  One can only speculate as to  the  reasons for the  lack of Russian  cooperation; one suspects, on the basis of  Pim’s own  account,  that 
the  tone of his  remarks to the tsar during a perronal audience and the  implied  lack of confidence in the tsar’s commitment to arrange for a search to 
be mounted  along the arctic  coasts of Siberia for wreckage or survivors from the Franklin  expedrtion may  have contributed significantly to  the  rejec- 
tion of his  proposai. 
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RÉSUh& Comme  bien de ses contemporains,  le  lieutenant  Bedford Pim de la  Royal  Navy, croyait B l’existence  d’une  mer  polaire ouverte, au-deh 
d’une zone de glace cstibre bordant I’octan Arctique. Fort de cette  croyance, P l’automne de 1851,  it  &mit  l’hypoth&  que  l’exp6dition de sir John 
Franklin  avait  navigué en direction du nord par le détroit de Wellington,  mettant  ensuite  directement  le cap B travers  la  mer  polaire sur le détroit de 
Btring, mais  qu’elle s’ttait fourvoyee dans me. chaîne d‘iles prises par les glaces alent de ce qui est maintenant  l’archipel  Arctique jusqu’aux envi- 
rons  de  l’île  Vrangel. Apr& s’€tre vu refuser  l’autorisation de l’Amiraut6 pour mettre B exkution son plan consistant B monter une exp6dition  par 
terre de  petite envergure vers  Qlukotka - d ’ d  il  comptait pousser plus au nord B travers la banquise B la recherche des navires de Franklin -, Pim 
parvint B gagaer l’appui de Lady  Franklin et de la  Royal  Geographical Society. En d h m b r e  1851, il se rendit B Saint-Etersbourg, o ù ,  apks une très 
longue attente, il se vit refuser  par  les  autori& russes I’autorisation de pousser pius B l’est. La principale  raison invoquk pour ce refus  tenait B 
l’envergure  de I’expt5dition: les Russes,  d’une  manikre ou d’une  autre,  avaient  mal interpdté les  plans  de Pim, et de  deux ou trois hommes  qu’elle 
devait comporter au départ,  I’exp6dition  &ait  devenue  une owation majeure nkessitant de 1200 P 1500 chiens de traîneau; les Russes  pensaient 
qu’une owration de  ce genre  bouleverserait l’&momie du  bassin de la  Kolyma et constituerait une  perturbation  importante  pour les habitants.  On  ne 
peut que  sp&uler quant aux  dritabtables raisons du manque de coop4ration russe, et il est p e d s  de penser, B la lumikre  du *it de Pim  &me,  que  le 
ton des remarques  adresSees au tsar en audience  priv&, ainsi que le manque de confiance qui en ressort visa-vis de l’engagement  du tsar B autoriser 
des recherches  le  long des c6tes arctiques de SiWrie en vue de trouver des traces des survivants de I’expMition  Franklin,  peuvent avoir contribué  de 
façon  significative au rejet de sa proposition. 
Mots cl&:  recherche  de  I’expedition  Franklin,  SiWrie,  lieutenant  Bedford  Pim 
Traduit pour le journal par Ntsida Loyer. 
INTRODUCTION 
By autumn 1851 Sir John Franklin’s expedition aboaxd 
Erebus and Terror, which  had sailed from  England in summer 
1845 to attempt the Northwest  Passage,  had  been missing for 
six years.  A  wide-ranging series of expeditions, operating both 
by sea and  overland  and mounted by the Royal Navy, the 
Hudson’s  Bay  Company  and  private  individuals,  was  dis- 
patched to the  North  American  Arctic from 1847 onwards.  In 
fall 1850, clear evidence in the form of  graves  and other signs 
of  a wintering at Beechey  Island at the southwest tip of  Devon 
Island indicated that Franklin’s ships had wintered at least 
once in 1845-46. Despite thorough searches, no message  was 
found to indicate the direction Franklin had  headed on leaving 
Beechey Island. Charles Forsyth, of Prince Albert, brought 
news of the finds back to England  in fall 1850 (Snow,  1851). 
Despite a  wide-ranging pattern of sledge searches, no further 
traces of the  Franklin expedition were found by other expedi- 
tions in summer 185 1. The clues at Beechey Island were  the 
only indications of the fate of the Franklin expedition to be 
uncovered by this  array of searches. 
LIEUTENANT  BEDFORD  PIM 
On the basis of the Beechey Island finds, as well as his own 
experience  and  reading, a young naval  officer,  Lieutenant 
Bedford Clapperton Trevelyan Pim, conceived  a  rather  novel 
scheme for a further search. Born  on 12 June 1826 at Bideford 
in  Devon (Dictionary of National  Biography, 1921-22; 
Dictionary of Canadinn Biography, 1982), the son of a naval 
lieutenant, Pim was educated at the Royal  Naval School, New 
Cross, and entend the  Navy  in  1842.  In 1845 he  was posted to 
HMS Hewld, under  Captain Henry Kellett, who had been 
commissioned to survey and map  the Pacific coast of north- 
western South America, Central America and Baja  California. 
On 9 May 1848 Heruld was  lying at Panama  when she was 
ordered  north to support Plover in the search for Franklin. 
Hence Bedford ?im was aboard Herald when, during a swing 
west in the Chukchi Sea dong the edge  of the pack,  the high, 
rocky mass of Ostrov Geral’da was  sighted m 17  August 1849 
(Seemann, 1853E2j). A landing party went ashore and both 
from Ostrov Geral’da and from the ship  another land mass 
with  high,  broken  peaks  was sighted to the west,  some 96 km 
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away by Kellett’s estimate. Kellett identified this land mass 
with  that mentioned earlier (from reports by the Chukchi on 
the Siberian mainland) by Leytenant Ferdinand Vrangel’ in 
the early 1820s. Kellett  named it Plover Land, after Herald’s 
consort, but it appeared on the Admiralty charts as Kellett’s 
Land, its northern extent being left deliberately vague. 
Before sailing south to winter  in  Mexican waters, Herald 
met Plover at Kotzebue  Sound,  where Bedford Pim  transferred 
to the latter ship and  wintered aboard her at Chamisso Island 
in Kotzebue Sound. 
During that wintering Pim and the other  officers aboard 
Plover picked  up  rumours from local people of  two ships that 
had  been  seen east of Point Barrow. For at least a  year  they 
had also been  hearing persistent rumours among the natives  of 
white  men living and travelling in the interior of Alaska. Pim 
logically  decided  that clarification of  both rumours could  prob- 
ably be obtained from the Russian authorities at Mikhailovskiy 
(now St. Michael) and  offered to travel there by sledge  to 
enquire (Seemann, 1853[2]). Commander Moore was recep- 
tive, and on 11 March 1850, accompanied by  a Russian inter- 
preter, Bosky, Pim started out with supplies for 15 days. 
Heading south across the hilly interior of the Seward Penin- 
sula and then across the ice of Norton Sound, they ran into 
foul  weather  and  poor  sledging  conditions.  They  reached 
Mikhailovskiy on 6 April,  having survived for 26 days  on 
what  they  had  been able to hunt or to procure from the natives. 
Pm was very  warmly  welcomed  by  the Russian commander 
Andrey  Gusev. 
The latter confirmed the rumour of whites living in  the  inte- 
rior of  Alaska on the banks of a river called the Ekko, and  Pim 
concluded that  they  must be members of the missing Franklin 
expedition. But since he himself  was short of funds and provi- 
sions,  there was no point in setting  off in search,  and he 
decided to report back to Commander Moore. He was back 
aboard Plover in  her  winter  quarters  on 29 April  1850. 
Although  he  had  high hopes of being allowed to head into the 
interior to track down the intriguing rumour, to his surprise 
and disappointment Commander Moore “did  not consider any 
of the  rumours of importance”  (Seemann, 1853[2]:145). 
Nonetheless  this sledge trip of Pim’s  is  of great significance to 
his career in  that it gave him firsthand experience in winter 
sledge travel in the North and also experience of amicable, 
productive contacts with cooperative Russian officials. 
Transferring back to Herald in summer 1850, Pim  returned 
to England on 6 June 185 1. He was promoted lieutenant that 
September. 
PIM’S PROPOSAL 
At about this time Pim conceived his plan for an indepen- 
dent search for Franklin on the northeast coast of Siberia, a 
plan on which several of the aforementioned earlier incidents 
and aspects of his  career have important bearings. Another 
aspect with  a significant bearing on Pim’s proposal is the fact 
that  while Sir John Franklin’s instructions stressed that his pri- 
mary aim was to reach the longitude of Cape Walker and  from 
there to “steer to the southward and westward towards Bering 
Strait in as straight a line as is permitted by ice or any  unknown 
land”  (Cyriax, 1939:45), the  next clause specified that “should 
a permanent obstruction be found to the southward of Cape 
Walker, he is to consider the alternative of passing between 
Cornwallis Island and North  Devon  if the strait between  them 
(Wellington Channel) is open” (Cyriax, 1939:46). This plus 
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the evidence of Franklin’s ships having  wintered at Beechey 
Island  and the lack  of  any traces of  the expedition along  the 
mainland coast or the coasts of  Victoria  Island  from  Amundsen 
Gulf  west to Bering Strait persuaded  Pim  that Franklin’s ships 
must have pushed  north along Wellington Channel. 
Like many of his contemporaries, Pim firmly believed in 
the existence of an “open polar sea.” This concept appears to 
have been first mooted in 1765 by the Swiss geographer 
Samuel Engel, who, believing that  ice formed only from fresh 
water and could be expected only near land, proposed that an 
extensive open sea should be located in  the  High  Arctic lati- 
tudes, away from land (Engel, 1765). In Britain the idea was 
vigorously  promoted  by Daines Barrington, a vice president of 
the Royal Society, who read two papers to the  society  on  the 
topic in 1774 and published his ideas at considerable length 
(Barrington, 1775). At the  time  of the Franklin searches, as we 
will see, the idea was fully espoused by such an eminent sci- 
entist as the hydrographer to the Navy, Sir Francis Beaufort, 
while even as late as 1875 such an experienced whaling cap- 
tain as David Gray of  Peterhead  was arguing, quite convinc- 
ingly, that there must be a “wide, open sea” to the north of 
80°, on the basis of his own observations of the amount of ice 
he  had seen being evacuated with the East Greenland Current 
in 1874 (Gray, 1984; Barr, 1984). Belief  in  the idea was  badly 
shaken by  Albert Markham’s discovery in spring 1876 (during 
the British North Pole Expedition) that sea ice extended at 
least as  far north as 83O, to the north of Ellesmere  Island 
(Markham, 1878). The concept was finally laid to rest by the 
drift of Fridtjof Nansen’s Fram across the Arctic Basin in 
1893-96 (Nansen, 1897). 
Given his views, Pirn  was able to envisage that Erebus and 
Terror had sailed across the Pole in open water heading for 
Bering Strait but had somehow run into  difficulties on the 
Siberian coast. On 27 September 185 1 Pim  wrote to their lord- 
ships of the Admiralty proposing that he  mount an overland 
search of the northeast shores of Siberia, having first travelled 
overland from St. Petersburg to the Kolyma River.  From  there 
he  would 
completely  explore  every approachable part of the Arctic  shore 
(from  Cape  Sievero  Vostotchini Nos [sic] to the  Cape  North  of 
Cook, a distance  of about 1,300 miles), and thus finally  set the 
question at rest whether the missing ships, or any traces of 
them, are to be found [Great Britain, 1852: 94-95]. 
Pim specifically proposed a small party, namely, himself 
and  two compinions. It is  significant  that he  warned  the  Admir- 
alty that the major shipborne expeditions still in the Arctic 
(Austin’s  Royal  Navy  squadron of four ships, William Penny’s 
expedition with two ships and Sir John Ross’s expedition with 
two ships, quite apart from  the  American effort represented  by 
the expedition in Advance and Rescue, and  the Royal Navy’s 
attempt at searching the North American Arctic via Bering 
Strait, represented by Enterprise and Investigator) “with the 
utmost exertion of talent and bravery can only follow in the 
path and consequently incur a similar risk as Sir John Frank- 
lin” (Great Britain, 1852:94-95). 
Some clarification of precisely the section of the Siberian 
coast Pim had in mind is in order (Fig. 1). Even  when  Pim  was 
writing, Mys  Severo-Vostochnyy was an archaic  name  for 
Mys  Dezhneva,  the headland on the west side of Bering Strait, 
generally known in Russia at the time as Vostochnyy Mys. 
This was almost certainly the cape Pim had  in mind; in other 
words he was proposing to search just the Russian shore of  the 
Chukchi Sea. But to confuse the issue, the length of coast 
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FIG. I .  Map of Siberia,  showing  Pim’s  proposed route and search  area. 
between there and Mys Severnyy (Cook’s Cape North, now 
Mys Shmidta) is only about 750 km, even including the shores 
of Kolyuchinskaya Guba, and  hence  was  only about one-third 
the  length  Pim  quoted.  ,There  is,  however,  another  Mys 
Severo-Vostochnyy, and this was the one to which  the  name 
was  more commonly applied.  It is located near Dikson, at the 
mouth of the Yenisey, at least 3500 km west of Mys  Shmidta. 
If one takes this to be the cape Pim had  in mind, one would 
conclude that  he  wanted to search most of the arctic coast of 
Siberia. This may  well  have  been a disastrous source of confu- 
sion  in terms of  how Pim’s proposal  was later received in St. 
Petersburg; and even if the Russian authorities realized the 
source of the confusion, it may  well have provided a conve- 
nient excuse for a simulated misunderstanding. 
One suspects that  Pim initially received, at best, only a non- 
commital acknowledgement, since, concerned at the way time 
was slipping, on 9 October he sent a more detailed outline of 
his proposal to the  secretary of the Admiralty, with a request 
that  he  be provided with  an official letter to Tsar Nicholas I 
asking for his cooperation in facilitating his journey to the 
Kolyma (Great Britain, 1852:95-96). 
Their lordships of the  Admiralty  had  not  been idle but  had 
solicited Captain Kellett’s views on Pim’s proposal. Kellett 
responded in very supportive terms on 11 October, stressing 
Pim’s ability, enthusiasm, endurance, perseverance and  physi- 
cal strength and  urging  that he should start immediately (Great 
Britain, 1852:96). 
RebufSfrom the Admiralty 
But the reaction from the Admiralty, as relayed  in a letter 
from J. Parker, secretary of the Admiralty, 21 October, was 
negative  and  indeed rather curt (Great Britain, 1852:96). One 
wonders  whether the tone of Pim’s letter was  not  his downfall. 
While it was probably appropriate for a captain of Kellett’s 
seniority to make suggestions to their lordships as  to the tim- 
ing of a proposed operation, they  probably  did  not  take  very 
kindly to being told  by a newly commissioned lieutenant that 
he  wanted to proceed  with the preliminaries “at once.” 
It also seems likely that part of the reason for Pim’s offer 
being declined was  that the lords of the Admiralty  conceived 
that the same objective might be more  effectively attained 
(and  the  risk of ruffling  Russian feathers greatly  reduced) if the 
Russians could be persuaded to search their own arctic coasts. 
On  the same day that  he  wrote to reject Pim’s proposal,  Parker 
had  written to H. Addington at the Foreign Office requesting 
that 
his  Lordship  will  communicate  with  the  Russian  minister, if he 
sees  no  objection,  and  represent  to  the  Emperor  the  thanks of 
the  Board of Admiralty  for the interest  His  Imperial  Majesty 
has  always  taken  in  the  fate  of  our  officers  and  that  Lord 
Palmerston  will  state  to  him  the  expectation  entertained  in 
some  quarters,  and  express  a  hope  that  His  Majesty  may  be 
induced  to  issue  directions  that  any  information  of  wrecked 
vessels may be carefully investigated and transmitted to his 
Government  [Great  Britain, 1852:97-981. 
The message, as requested, was relayed to St. Petersburg 
and in due course, on 19 November, Sir Hamilton Seymour, 
the British ambassador in St. Petersburg, wrote to say  that  the 
message had  been forwarded to Count Senyavin, the imperial 
chancellor. 
On 14 November  the latter replied to the effect that: 
His  Majesty  the  Emperor,  who  possesses  a  true  interest  in 
the  fate  of  the  famous  navigator  and  of  his  brave  companions, 
has  deigned  to  receive  this  request  with  benevolence  and  the 
Ministers  of  the  Marine  and  of  the  Interior  will  take,  as  a  mat- 
ter  of  high  priority,  and  each  as  to  how  it  concerns  him,  the 
necessary dispositions so that very careful investigations are 
implemented  with  the  above-mentioned  goal  on  the  north 
coasts of Asia,  where  Russia  possesses  some  establishments or 
some  support  with  the  natives  [Great  Britain, 1852:98]. 
Support from Beaufort  and Lady Franklin 
Pim  refused  to  be  discouraged  by  the  rebuff  he  had  received 
from the Admiralty. He  had  in  the  interim  been  in  touch  with 
Lady Franklin, who  had  not only enthusiastically espoused his 
proposal, but  had promised to support him to  an amount of 
E500. On 23 October he again wrote to the secretary of the 
Admiralty requesting leave and support in principle (Great 
Britain, 1852). 
If Pim  expected  an  enthusiastic  response  from  the 
Admiralty, he was soon disillusioned: on the 28th J. Parker 
penned a blunt, grudging response, indicating that their lord- 
ships had  no intention of extending any sort of official status 
to Pim (Great Britain, 1852). 
In the interim  Pim  had also been  in touch with  the  hydrog- 
rapher, Sir Francis Beaufort, concerning his scheme. In one 
letter,  Beaufort not only  confirmed  the  basic  premises of 
Pim’s argument but  had also made a suggestion  that  led  Pim to 
alter the proposed focus of his  search somewhat. Beaufort 
wrote: 
I have  at  all  times,  both  publicly  and  privately,  expressed 
my  conviction  that if the  Erebus  and  Terror  should  succeed  in 
passing  through  Wellington  Channel,  they  would  find  the 
Northern Ocean comparatively free from ice, and find it an 
easy  matter  to  penetrate  to  the  westward.  Franklin’s  difficulties 
would therefore begin when, having made his westing, he 
might  endeavour  to  haul  to  the  southward  for  Bherings  [sic] 
Straits:  for  Cook,  Beechey,  Kellett  and  all  navigators  who  have 
passed  through  that  opening,  found  the  soundings  decrease,  on 
approaching  the  southern  edge  of  the  ice,  thus  making  it 
almost  demonstrable  that  a  bank  of  some  hundreds  of  miles  in 
length, and most likely rising up into many islands, stretches 
across  from  east  to  west. If those  ships,  therefore,  did  find  their 
way  through  Wellington  Channel  (of  which  there  cannot be 
any  doubt  B.P.)  they  have  got  into  some  labyrinth  of  ice  and 
islands  abreast of Bherings  Straits, or perhaps  further  west  on 
the  flats of the  coast  of  Siberia  [Pim,  1851aI. 
No doubt recalling the distant view  of “Kellett Land” as 
seen  from  Ostrov Geral’da, which  he interpreted as the  most 
westerly of the chain of  icebound islands that Beaufort envis- 
aged  extending  right  across  to  link up with the Canadian 
Arctic Islands, Pim  immediately identified with this alternate 
view  of  the  probable fate of the Franklin expedition. 
Still enthused with the concept of mounting an overland 
search, he  decided to proceed on his own. His first step was to 
get official clearance to go to Russia.  “An  interview  with the 
noble  head of the  Foreign Office was obtained, and I cannot 
speak too gratefully of the kindness of Lord Palmerston on 
that occasion, as well as Mr. Addington’s promptness in for- 
warding  the  necessary  documents” (Pim, 185 la). 
Backing of the  Royal  Geographical Society 
A more auspicious development was Lieutenant Pim’s suc- 
cess in gaining the support of Robert Brown, president of the 
Linnaean  Society  and a fellow of the  Royal  Geographical 
Society. Brown introduced him to Sir Roderick Murchison, 
president  of  the  Royal  Geographical  Society,  who  was  extremely 
supportive of Pim’s plans (Pim, 1851a).  Among  the letters of 
introduction  written  by Sir Roderick  was one to Grand  Duke 
Constantine, dated 6 November, with  the stated objective to 
“venture to ask  Your  Impl. Highness to exercise those feelings 
of a true seaman  by  which I know you are animated, and to 
take under  your  high protection the  young British officer who 
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devotes his services to this very arduous task” (Murchison, 
1851a). The very  next  day Sir Roderick  wrote  in similar vein 
to Count Karl Nesselrode, Russian minister of Foreign Affairs 
(Pasetskiy, 1984). 
Another of these  letters of introduction,  written on 10 
November, was addressed to the secretary of the Imperial Rus- 
sian Geographical Society. Having again outlined Pim’s plan, 
Sir Roderick (writing in French) appealed for that society’s 
support for Pim’s enterprise (Murchison, 1851b). 
At Sir Roderick’s invitation, Pim  presented his plan  and an 
outline of the most recent developments to a meeting of the 
Royal Geographical Society on 10 November (Pim, 1851a). 
Among those present were the Russian ambassador, F.I. 
Brynov, the secretary to the Russian Embassy, Count Wiel- 
horskiy, Admiral Sir Francis Beaufort, Robert Brown, Captain 
William  Penny  and Captain Henry  Kellett. 
Pim reported  that  he  planned to depart for St. Petersburg on 
15 November; initially he  had  hoped  that  Berthold Seemann, 
his former shipmate aboard Herald, would  be able to accom- 
pany him, but Seemann was too busy with his book on the 
Herald voyage.  Pim  was obliged to go alone, in anticipation of 
a companion being provided by the Russian government. 
Supposing  that  the  negotiations  with  the  Court  of  Russia 
terminate  favourably,  my  track  would  lead  from  St.  Petersburg 
to Moscow by railway; from Moscow to Irkutz [Irkutsk] by 
telegi or sledges,  a  distance  of 3544 miles  and  from  Irkutz  to 
Iakoutz [Yakutsk] also on sledges, a distance of 1824, the 
whole  journey  occupying  about 4 months. 
At  Iakoutz  all  regular  travelling  conveniences  terminate, 
and the 1200 miles  to  the  River  Kolyma  as  well  as  the 2000 
miles  of  search  will  have  to  be  performed  in  a  manner  best 
adapted  to the resources  of  the  country.  In  1854  the  task  may 
be  completed if unfortunately  before  that  time  no  traces  should 
have  been  found  [Pim,  1851al. 
After Pim’s presentation his former commanding officer, 
Captain Henry Kellett, complimented him  on his presentation 
and assured the meeting that  he “was an officer fully compe- 
tent to perform the journey he  had taken in  hand (Cheers)” 
(The Times, 1851a). Similarly supportive remarks were also 
made by Captain William Penny, Major Carmichael Smyth 
and Sir Woodbine Parrish. Significantly Count Wielhorskiy, 
secretary to the  Russian  Embassy,  “promised, on the  part of the 
Russian Government, that Lieutenant Pim  should receive from 
the Imperial Government at St. Petersburgh the best reception, 
and  that every means would be afforded him to assist him  in 
so noble  and generous an enterprise” (The Times, 1851a). To 
close the meeting a resolution was  passed  that  on  Pim’s  behalf 
the Council of  the Society should “solicit the countenance and 
assistance of  the Admiralty” (The Times, 1851a). 
Sir Roderick Murchison’s letter, written in compliance with 
that resolution, included one quite specific request: 
that waiving in this very special & remarkable occasion the 
technical  rules  of  ordinary  service,  you  will  induce  the  Board 
[of] Admiralty to place  Lt.  Pim  on  full  pay  during  this  mission 
[Murchison,  1851bI. 
This appeal, however, was  unsuccessful. Perhaps anticipat- 
ing this result, on the same day  Murchison also wrote to the 
prime minister, Lord John Russell, to request that “. . . as First 
Lord of the Treasury . . . you  will, if  you  deem it right, direct 
that the sum of E500 be contributed by the  public to aid in car- 
rying out the arddous survey proposal, which  will  occupy  two 
or three years” (Murchison, 1851~;  The Times, 1851b). This 
appeal  was substantially more successful than  that  made to the 
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Admiralty. The prime minister approved payment of f500 to 
Pim  and even added a personal note of concern, trusting that: 
“. . . he will not, in the ardour of his pursuit, risk  unduly his 
own life. I wish him every success. Yours faithfully, J. 
Russell” (The Times, 1851b). 
Immediately prior to Pim’s departure from London for St. 
Petersburg, also on 25 November, Sir Roderick Murchison 
wrote  him a final letter of advice (Murchison, 1851d). In it he 
noted  that  he  had  already  given  him  hints  on  making geologi- 
cal  observations  and  that  he  had  already  referred  him  to 
Colonel Sabine for advice on  magnetic observations. He had 
also given  him letters of introduction to Baron  Alexander  von 
Humboldt  and  Adolf  Erman  in Berlin, with  the intention that 
they  might give him further advice.  Erman  was  known partic- 
ularly for his temperature measurements made in 1829 in a 
shaft sunk in the permafrost at Yakutsk (Belov, 1956). 
Murchison  had also paved Pim’s way, once he arrived in  St. 
Petersburg, with letters to Admiral Ferdinand von Vrangel’, 
Professor A.F. Middendorf, Academician K.M. Baer and 
Academician L. Helmersen, as well as to the secretary of the 
Imperial Geographical Society; the intent was that they, “in 
case your journey should  be approved, will furnish you with 
every requisite suggestion” (Murchison, 185 Id).  The  letter 
concluded with  the solicitous suggestion: “Do not omit to take 
a few essential medicines; though I trust that  with  your  good 
constitution you will have  no  want of them”  (Murchison, 
1851d). 
Reception in St. Petersburg 
Although there was no lack of volunteers to accompany 
him, Pim left London on 18  November  accompanied  only by 
Captain Robbins, one of the queen’s Foreign Service messen- 
gers  (by  arrangement of Lord  Palmerston).  In  Berlin  he 
“received the  most marked attention and  approval  of my  plan 
from the illustrious Humboldt and  Adolf Erman, both great 
Siberian travellers, and His Majesty the King of Prussia took a 
deep interest in  the project, and strongly recommended me to 
the  Emperor  of  Russia” (Pim, 1851d).  No  doubt  greatly  encour- 
aged by this positive response, Pim continued to St. Peters- 
burg, arriving on 5 December 18.5 1. 
There the British ambassador, Sir Hamilton Seymour, took 
him  under  his  wing  and  arranged for him to see Count Nessel- 
rode (Pim, 185 lb) and other  influential people. On 9 Dec- 
ember  Pim  received a visit from Captain Kruzenshtern. That 
evening he  met  Helmersen and Middendorf at a gathering at 
Baer’s house.  Middendorf gave Pim  what  the latter considered 
good advice. “He recommended three things. To ask the 
Emperor for a particular order to travel through Siberia, that 
orders should be at once transmitted to preserve and collect 
dogs at Niznei Kolymsk.  And  that  meal  should be sent from 
Jakutz to that  place as early as possible” (Pim, 1851d33 1).  On 
the  following  day  Kruzenshtern  took Pim to  see Admiral 
Matyushkin, “and from him I obtained a great deal of useful 
information  but  largely  tinctured  with  the  besetting  cry 
‘impossibiliti’. Turn which way I will it is the same” (Pim, 
1851d:32). On a visit to General Muravyev, vice president of 
the Imperial Geographical Society, on 11 December Pim’s 
host  advised  him  “that  nothing  could  be  done  until  the 
Emperor’s decision was known” (Pim, 1851d333). On 16 
December Middendorf visited the British embassy to inspect 
Pim’s boat, guns  and other equipment. 
Although  Pim  may  have  been  somewhat frustrated by  the 
results, he had already met some of  the  most eminent arctic 
travellers and scientists in  Russia.  Academician G.P. Helmer- 
sen  had sponsored and encouraged a number  of expeditions to 
the arctic coasts of European Russia in the 1830s and 1840s 
(Pasetskiy, 1984). Academician K.M. Baer, a botanist and 
zoologist,  had  led  the first truly  scientific  expedition to Novaya 
Zemlya in 1843 (Belov, 1956). A.F. Middendorf had discov- 
ered Ozero Taymyr  and  had  explored the Taymyr River to its 
mouth during his extensive travels across Siberia in 1843 
(Belov, 1956). P.I. Kruzenshtern had explored the Pechora 
basin to the sea, also in 1843 (Pasetskiy, 1984). And finally 
F.F. Matyushkin was probably the most experienced arctic 
traveller of them all, having  accompanied  Ferdinand Vrangel’ 
on several of  his  trips across the sea ice of the  East Siberian 
Sea and having made an impressive inland journey through 
Chukotka on his own behalf  in 1822 (Wrangell, 1841). 
But still there was  no definite response from Count  Nessel- 
rode, and Pim became increasingly frustrated. The level of 
frustration is clearly apparent in the letter he wrote to Lady 
Franklin on New  Year’s Eve: 
It is  impossible  to  imagine  my  impatience  and  anxiety  at  a 
delay so detrimental  to  the  cause  when  day  after  day  passed 
and I received  no  intimation  of  the  Imperial  pleasure.  In  the 
meantime,  however,  I  consulted  everyone  capable of forming  a 
judgement  on  the  subject,  particularly  those  Sir  Roderick 
Murchison  advised  me  to  see  and  whose  experience  rendered 
them  well  able  to do so. All  of  them  invariably  expressed  the 
same  opinion  as  to  the  impossibility  of  overcoming  the  dan- 
gers  and  difficulties  which  would  oppose  my  undertakings but 
when I asked  those  who  had  accomplished  the  very  same  jour- 
ney  how  they  managed  I  never  could  get  any  other  answer  than 
the  oft-repeated  one  “you cunnor succeed.”  From  this  universal 
concurrence  of  opinion  it  would  appear  these  people  had 
received  their  cue  before  my  arrival.  In  fact  some  of  the 
English  residents,  well  informed  in  such  matters,  told me  such 
was  the  case  [Pim,  1851bI. 
On 19 December Pim was somewhat encouraged to  be 
informed by the Court Chamberlain that he was to be pre- 
sented to the tsar on 21 December, although his enthusiasm 
was  somewhat  dampened by the fact that others would also be 
present  and hence “I should  not  have  sufficient  time to say I 
all wished (Pim, 185 ld36). 
Oficial Reaction 
That  afternoon  Pim  received  discouraging  news  from  Count 
Nesselrode. In the  interim the count  had in fact set the wheels 
in motion.  The  files of the  Archives of Foreign  Policy of 
Russia (Arkhiv  vneshney politiki Rossii)  in  Moscow contain a 
memorandum addressed to Nesselrode and, according to the 
Soviet  historian  Pasetskiy  (1984),  probably  written by 
Academician A.A. Keyzerling. Keyzerling, along with P.I. 
Kruzenshtern, had explored and surveyed the basins of the 
Upper  Vychegda  and the Pechora in summer 1843 (Pasetskiy, 
1984). Keyzerling’s reaction to Pim’s proposal was far from 
encouraging. Probably his  most  damning  remark was that 
“The idea of travelling by dog team  of  itself is scarcely feasi- 
ble since by Pim’s  own calculations he  would  need about 1500 
dogs, a number  which  would  be quite difficult to assemble in 
the  whole of Siberia” (Pasetskiy, 1984:254). Since, in its final 
form, Pim’s  plan envisaged him travelling with  only one com- 
panion, it seems very unlikely that he would have specified 
such  an  unbelievably large number  of dogs and  indeed, as we 
will see, he  went to great lengths to counter this idea. Perhaps 
Keyzerling had simply mistranslated some crucial phrase in 
Pim’s  submission. Be that as it may, Keyzerling deduced  that 
to supply Pim’s expedition with these sorts of numbers of 
dogs, sledges, drivers and appropriate amounts of dog food 
would involve “setting an entire people in motion.” Whether 
Pim’s proposed plan had been misconstrued accidentally or 
deliberately, Keyzerling’s arguments  were readily seized upon 
by the Russian authorities as providing legitimate grounds for 
refusing Pim  permission  to  proceed. 
Keyzerling  continued:  “What  he proposes is  not to advance 
in a single direction, but a comprehensive journey around  the 
entire coastal strip of Siberia, from people to people, nomad 
camp to nomad camp, village to village, i.e., a progress  around, 
and a search of the entire country” (Pasetskiy, 1984:254). One 
wonders if in his submission to St. Petersburg Pim  had again 
identified Mys  Severo-Vostochniy as one of the end points of 
his search. If it was assumed to be  the one on the Kara Sea 
coast (or if a pretense of  that interpretation was  being made), 
some  of  Keyzerling’s pretended concern starts to make  sense. 
Certainly Keyzerling suspected Pim of an ulterior motive, 
namely, an extensive reconnaissance of northern Siberia, 
implementation of which might be detrimental to Russian 
interests. Anglo-Russian relations had deteriorated drastically 
from the heady years of rapprochement, both political and 
commercial, negotiated by Nesselrode  between  1836  and 1843 
and culminating in Tsar Nicholas’s visit to England in June 
1844 (Ingle, 1976). Since then relations had cooled signifi- 
cantly as a result of conflicting policies on the complicated 
range of topics that by 1851 had dragged the two countries 
close to open  warfare,  destined to erupt in the Crimean War in 
March 1854. In  this era of distrust, any  hint of such an ulterior 
design would have been enough to scuttle Pim’s project. In 
conclusion Keyzerling  argued  that if Franklin had landed any- 
where on the  north coast of Siberia the local Nentsi, Evenki, 
Ostyaki or Chukchi, being nomadic, would long since have 
found traces of the expedition and would immediately have 
informed the Russian authorities. 
On the basis of this memorandum, and presumably after 
consultation with other arctic experts, on 18 December Count 
Nesselrode  wrote (in French) to Sir Hamilton Seymour to pre- 
sent the official reaction of the Russian government to Pim’s 
plan. This was the “despatch of  the  most discouraging nature” 
that Pim  received on 19 December. Count Nesselrode started 
by stressing the tsar’s ongoing interest in the search for 
Franklin;  he had transmitted  orders  to  the  Siberian  and 
Alaskan authorities to provide every assistance to Royal  Navy 
ships  engaged in the search, had arranged  for  the  rewards 
offered by Lady  Franklin  and by the British Government to be 
publicized, and  most  recently  had ordered that  any information 
on recent shipwrecks on  the  northern coasts of Siberia be for- 
warded to St.  Petersburg. 
While sympathetic to Pim’s plan, the tsar felt that it was 
totally  impracticable: 
it  cannot  be  forgotten  that  independently  of  the  enormous  dis- 
tances  to  be  covered,  vast  wildernesses  buried  beneath  eternal 
snows  must  also  be  traversed,  where  no  means  of  transporting 
provisions  can be found,  unexplored  regions  over  whose  sur- 
faces  are  scattered  totally  wild  tribes  over  whom  Russia  exer- 
cises  only  very  limited  control  and  whose  belligerent  nature, 
barbarous  customs  and  hatred  of  strangers  are  such  that  the 
Imperial  Government  would  find  itself  unable  to  guarantee 
even  the  personal  safety of Mr. Pim or his companions. To 
give  some  idea  of  the  difficulties  such  a  journey  presents,  one 
cannot  do  better  than to recall  the  expedition  undertaken  sev- 
eral years  ago  under  the  command of Admiral  Vrangel’. 
Although  the  local  authorities  had  prepared for it  beforehand, 
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and  although  undertaken  on  an  infinitely  smaller  scale  than  the 
one now under consideration, that  expedition had to be 
reduced  even  further  due  to  an  epidemic  which  was  raging 
amongst  the  dogs  used  for  hauling  the  sledges  and  yet,  despite 
all  the  reductions  he  was  able  to  make  Admiral  Vrangel’  still 
required 50 sledges,  necessitating  the  use  of 600 dogs  [Nessel- 
rode,  1 85 1  a]. 
On the basis of Vrangel’s experience, Nesselrode argued 
that Pim’s expedition would require 1200-1500 dogs and cor- 
responding amounts of dog food: 
Now these animals are kept by the inhabitants only in suffi- 
cient  numbers for their  own  use  and  it  is  doubtful  whether  such 
a  large  number  could be assembled  even  if  one  were  to  disre- 
gard  the  total  ruin  of  the  population.  As  for  the  notion  of 
undertaking  such  a  journey  at  once  and  without  any of the 
essential  preparations,  the  Imperial  Government  does  not  hesi- 
tate  to  consider  it physically impossible [Nesselrode,  185  1  a]. 
Possibly the crux of the objections to Pim’s plan lies in one 
of Nesselrode’s concluding paragraphs: 
One  must  conclude  from  such  considerations  that  the  goal 
of  Mr.  Pim’s  plan  in  practical  terms  can  scarcely be attained 
otherwise than by the dispositions already made by the 
Imperial  Government,  aimed  at  collecting  through  the  local 
authorities  as  intermediaries,  both  from  the  inhabitants  of  the 
Arctic  Ocean  coast  and  from  Russian  or  foreign  navigators  fre- 
quenting  these  seas,  all  possible  information on ships which 
had been wrecked there over the past few years [Nesselrode, 
1851aI. 
Since  the  experiences of  Baron  Ferdinand  Petrovich  Vrangel’ 
during his expedition of 1820-24 are central to the arguments 
of both  sides, it  is appropriate  to  examine  that  expedition 
briefly. Vrangel’s mandate (Wrangell, 1841)  was to survey  the 
coast east from Shelagskiy Nos (Fig. 2) towards Bering Strait 
and also the Medvezh’i Ostrova and to search for land north of 
Chukotka, land whose existence had  long  been  reported by the 
local  Chukchi.  Over  the  course of three  years  (1821-23) 
Vrangel’  surveyed  the  entire  coast  from  the  mouth of the 
Kolyma to Kolyuchinskaya  Guba  and  also  made  repeated 
determined attempts to search for land to the  north.  At differ- 
ent times these attempts got him to 71’43% to the northeast of 
the  Medvezh’i  Ostrova,  to 71’52’N to the  north  of  Mys 
Bol’shoy Baranov, and  then to 72”02’N, 164’1O’E, and  finally 
to 70”51’N, 175’27’E, in  Proliv  Longa. The latter effort was  in 
response to a report obtained from the local Chukchi that land 
was visible to the north in fine weather. Significantly every 
one of these endeavours by Vrangel’ was  brought to a halt by 
thin,  dangerous  ice  or by open water. On one occasion, in 
Proliv Longa, the party even spent a night adrift on a floe but 
managed to reach  the fast ice again safely (Wrangell, 1841). 
From Vrangel’s repeated experience of encountering open 
water or dangerously thin ice, one can certainly see why Pim 
felt that his reports substantiated his belief  in an open polar 
sea. At the same time, however, even conceding that some 
land (namely, Ostrov Geral’da and “Kellett Land”) had  been 
discovered in the interim, one can certainly understand why 
the Russian authorities felt that everything humanly possible 
had already been done by Vrangel’ to find land north of 
Chukotka in the area Pim  was  proposing to search and  that his 
proposal, which implied that  he felt he  could penetrate farther 
than  such  an  enormously  experienced  arctic  traveller  as 
Vrangel’, was more than a little presumptuous at best, and 
rather insulting at worst. 
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FIG. 2. Map of Chukotka  and  Bering  Strait,  showing Pim’s proposed search  area  and  the  area of Vrangel’s  expeditions. 
Pim’s Rebuttal 
On 20 December Pim attended a “great diplomatic dinner” 
hosted by Sir Hamilton Seymour at the  embassy “at which  the 
ministers etc. of nearly every nation were assembled” (Pim, 
1851d337). After  the  guests had departed,  Pim  drafted a 
response to Count Nesselrode’s dispatch, presenting  his reac- 
tion to three specific points in  the dispatch, namely: 
lstly.  The  distance  to  be  travelled  over. 
2ndly.  The  number of persons  forming  the  expedition  and 
3rdly.  The  object  to  be  attained  [Pim,  1851d:37]. 
the  resources  required. 
He stressed that  he  was planning to cover no greater dis- 
tance  than Vrangel’ had, that his would be a small expedition 
consisting probably of just himself  and an interpreter, and  that 
an absolute maximum of 200 dogs  would be ample for all the 
support sledges he  might  need.  Finally  he emphasized that  his 
plan  was  not to search the arctic coast (which he recognized 
would  already  have  been done in response to the tsar’s instruc- 
tions)  but 
to  explore  the  belt  of  land  supposed  to  run  parallel  to  the  coast 
at  a  distance  of  about  160  miles,  of  the  existence  of  which 
Admiral  Wrangell  received  accounts,  and  which  English  geog- 
raphers  believe  to  extend  from  the  Parry  Islands to those  dis- 
covered by Her Britannic Majesty’s Frigate “Herald” while 
exploring in Behring’s Straits the year before last [Pim, 
1851~1. 
By quoting Wrangell’s arguments that, contrary to locally 
expressed concerns that  his  requests for dogs for his expedi- 
tion would be detrimental to the local people, his hiring of 
dogs and drivers had  in fact worked to the advantage of  the 
local economy, Pim rather neatly hoisted the Russians with 
their own petard. 
Audience with the Tsar 
Two days later, on 22 December, Pim had his audience 
with  the  tsar;  he  himself surmised in his journal entry for the 
21st that the delay “may be attributed to the despatch sent 
early this morning to Count Nesselrode - so far so well. I 
shall now have  an  opportunity of explaining myself thor- 
oughly to him” (Pim, 1851d:37). 
Writing  later  to Lady Franklin, Pim reported  that  Tsar 
Nicholas 
said  he  had  been  made  fully  acquainted  with  the  object  of my 
visit  to  Russia  and  that  however  anxious  he  might be to assist, 
he  knew  that  the  difficulties  to  be  overcome  were  insurmount- 
able  and  dwelt  much  upon  the  injurious  effect  which  furnish- 
ing  stores  for  such  an  expedition  as I wished  to  undertake 
would  produce  upon  the  tribes  inhabiting  the  northern  districts 
of Siberia. I ventured  to  express  my  conviction  that  His 
Majesty’s  fears on this  subject  were  unfounded  as  the  perusal 
of  the  narrative  of  Admiral  Wrangel  led  to  a  very  different 
supposition, and I used such other arguments as I imagined 
might  influence  his  decision  [Pim,  1851bI. 
From  this letter one gets the impression  that  Pim’s response 
to the tsar’s statements was quite forthright, and one suspects 
that  the “arguments as I imagined  might  influence  his decision” 
were  presented  in a tone  that  the tsar was  probably  not accus- 
tomed to hearing from a junior lieutenant. Pim might have 
unwittingly  thrown  away  whatever emaining chance he might 
have had of gaining the tsar’s support, As it was, he was 
dismissed with a request to draw  up a report of  his intentions 
for submission to a committee of experts. 
By the next day Pim  had completed the requested report 
and forwarded it to the tsar (Pim, 1851e). Having explained 
his assumptions with  regard to Franklin’s route and possible 
whereabouts, Pim attempted to neutralize any suggestion of 
criticism of earlier Russian efforts - i.e.,  those  of Vrangel’ or 
Matyushkin - on  the  basis that the experience gained in arc- 
tic travel in the intervening 30 years gave him an advantage 
(Pim, 1851e). 
With regard  to  the  concern expressed by the tsar about  the 
strain his expedition might place on the local economy and 
about possible hardships to the local people, Pim argued that 
these concerns were  not borne out by Vrangel’s statements (as 
noted earlier) that  the local people had derived significant ben- 
efit from  his expedition (Pim, 1851e). 
After a final assurance that “no risk  will  be incurred except 
to himself  [Pim]  and  such persons as may volunteer to accom- 
pany  him  on  his exploring journey” (Pim, 1851e), Pim  made 
the  suggestion  that if the government were to mount a larger 
expedition than  he  had in mind, he  would be very  happy to 
join it “as a subordinate officer.” 
Writing to Lady Franklin a week later, Pim  noted  ruefully 
that little had  happened  and  that 
up to this time it is not even known who is the appointed 
President  of  the  committee, so tardily  is  the  business  managed. 
In  the  meantime I have  been  presented  in  turn  to  the  Empress 
and  Imperial  Family  but  without  receiving  any  encouragement 
from  them. My ultimate  fate  is,  therefore  as  great  a  mystery  as 
ever. . . . My  position  here  is  not  a  pleasant  one.  The  Russians 
frown  or  smile  just  as  the  Emperor  does,  and I cannot  obtain 
any countenance or accurate information until the Imperial 
intention  to  countenance  the  undertaking  is  made  known  [Pim, 
1851bI. 
Matyushkin’s Assessment 
Unknown to Pim, events were taking their course. On 27 
December Count Nesselrode  wrote to Sir Hamilton Seymour 
(Nesselrode, 185 lb) with, as an enclosure, a commentary by 
Rear-Admiral F.F. Matyushkin (Matyushkin, 1851) on pre- 
sumably  both Pim’s original plan  and on his later submission 
to the tsar. Matyushkin thirty  years earlier had played a key 
role in Vrangel’s expedition. Apart from participating in sev- 
eral of the  sledge  trips  out  across  the  sea  ice  of  the  East  Siberian 
Sea,  Matyushkin had led  his  own  auxiliary  expeditions to 
explore the  basins of the  Bol’shoy  and  Malyy  Anyuy rivers in 
the  spring  and summer of 1821 (Belov, 1956) and  the  basin  of 
the Chaun River in August 1822. Thus, whether he was the 
president  of  the committee to whom the problem  was  referred 
by the tsar or he  was  simply a committee of one, he  was cer- 
tainly  well qualified to make a valid judgement. 
That judgement was quite unequivocal: “The researches 
made by Lieut.  Wrangel do not  in any way confirm the  suppo- 
sition that  there  would be to the  west  of  Wellington  Channel 
down to the  mouth  of  the  Kolyma a range of islands  at a distance 
of 160 miles from the continent and  that above these islands 
there  would extend an  open sea” (Matyushkin, 1851). Having 
summarized Vrangel’s and Anzhu’s penetrations out across 
the  sea  ice  from  either  the  mainland  coast or the  Novosi- 
birskiye Ostrova (to distances of 229 km and 273.6 km respec- 
tively on Vrangel’s second and third attempts), Matyushkin 
concluded that  the hypothetical land masses did not exist, that 
if there were  an  open polar sea, Franklin could have  reached 
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the Siberian coast without obstruction, and  that if his ships had 
been wrecked  there,  some word of that  event would have 
reached the authorities (Matyushkin, 185  1). 
In his covering letter, whi!e not offering support, Nessel- 
rode did  not  rule out the  possibility  that  Pim  might  proceed  on 
his own: 
If however,  in  spite  of  all  representations  which  have  been 
made  to  him  here  this  officer  should  persevere  in  his  intention 
to  explore  the  northern  coast  of  Siberia,  it  is  certainly  not  the 
Imperial  Government  that  would  wish  to  place  any  obstacle  in 
his  way. He  may be persuaded  that  our  most  fervent  wishes 
will accompany him on his adventurous enterprise. It will 
depend  on  himself  to  go  to  Siberia,  only  the  solicitude  of  the 
Emperor  for  the  natives  cannot  permit  His  Majesty  to  impose 
upon  them  by  means  of  compulsion  oppressions  that  would  be 
ruinous. If having  gone  to  those  parts  Mr.  Pim  can  succeed  to 
procure for himself  by  an  arrangement  of  mutual  consent  the 
number  of  teams  necessary  for  his  researches  we  shall  be 
charmed  [Nesselrode, 185 1 b]. 
Conceding Defeat 
Sir Hamilton Seymour’s assessment of.this attitude, as 
expressed in his covering letter (Seymour, 1852), effectively 
ended any hopes of Pim’s travelling beyond  St. Petersburg: 
As you  know  my  opinion  (formedupon  that  of  much  wiser 
men  than  myself)  has  always  been  that  to be successful  your 
journey  must be supported  by  all  the moral aid which  it  could 
receive  from  the  Imperial  Government  and  when  in  lieu of that 
nothing  is  promised  but an abstention from opposition - to 
proceed  would be - as I  hold - little  short of madness. 
Shortly after this Pim returned to London, baffled  and no 
doubt  disappointed. In  point of fact,  he  really had  good 
grounds for feeling quite proud  of  what  he  had achieved. Few 
foreign officers of his rank and youth (he was only 25) can 
have  had audiences with  the  tsar  and  the ntire imperial  family. 
And certainly no other British naval officer had  the enormous 
good fortune to have  protracted discussions about problems of 
arctic travel with such experts as Matyushkin or Middendorf 
or about matters of science with  such giants as Humboldt  and 
Ellllall. 
But although the British ambassador might  have  given  up 
hope, Lady Franklin had  not.  In his letter of 3 1 December Pim 
had suggested that he might have had better luck if he had 
arrived in  St.  Petersburg as a private individual, “as the  bearer 
of a petition  from  your Ladyship to His  Majesty”  (Pim,  1851b). 
Acting  on  this  remark, as a last  resort  Lady  Franklin  did 
indeed  write directly to the  tsar: 
not with  the  presumptious  intention  of  moving  you  to  reverse 
any  adverse  decision  to  which  in  the  exercise of the  most  ben- 
ficient  as  well  as  the  most  enlightened  judgment  you  may  have 
arrived,  but  only  to  entreat  that if any  measures  not  fraught 
with  insuperable  difficulties  nor  necessarily  endangering  the 
precious  lives  of  those  to be engaged  in  the  expedition,  be  sub- 
mitted to you, such  measures  may  meet  with  your  patient  and 
gracious  consideration  [Franklin, 18521. 
It is  not clear whether  Lady Franklin had  some new initiative 
in mind, but if so nothing ever came of it. 
ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS 
It i s  extremely difficult to assess the reasons for the official 
Russian refusal to support Pim’s proposal. Undoubtedly the 
growing tensions between Britain and Russia, which would 
~~~ ~~~~ 
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flare up into open hostilities only three years later, played  an 
important role in influencing Russian sensitivities concerning 
their Arctic, and Pim was certainly on the  right  track  when he 
remarked to Lady  Franklin, “I am quite  sure  there  must be some 
political motive for the impediments which have detained  me 
here so long” (Pim, 1851b). And no doubt he  was also correct 
in  his assessment that “had I appeared in  St.  Petersburg as Mr. 
instead of Lieut.  Pim R.N. and without any assistance from the 
Government, . . . that I should  much  more  easily  have obtained 
assistance from the Emperor” (Pim, 185 lb). 
However, there appears to be  a real possibility  that confu- 
sion as to the identification of  Mys Severo-Vostochnyy (which 
Pim  names as being the  end point of the stretch of coast he 
wished to search) may have led the Russian authorities to con- 
clude that  he  wished to search  most  of  the  Siberian  arctic  coast. 
Following from this, the deduction that he  would  need sub- 
stantial numbers of dogs becomes quite logical, and almost 
certainly the prospect of a British naval  officer wandering 
unaccompanied across Siberia, with practically carte blanche 
as to where  he  went,  must  have  made  the tsar and  the Russian 
military  authorities  nervous.  Pasetskiy  (1984:253) was  undoubt- 
edly correct in suggesting that Keyzerling “saw behind the 
proposed humanitarian goals of Pim’s journey far-reaching 
reconnaissance plans, implementation of which  might be detri- 
mental to the interests of Russia.”  Admiral  Fedor Litke, vice 
president of the  Russian Geographical Society and  himself  an 
arctic traveller of considerable experience, voiced the same 
idea even more pointedly, namely, that such an extravagant 
plan “could arise in the mind of an Englishman only with  a 
view to serving as a cover for some other ‘arri5re-pensee’ - 
less naive, but  more natural” (Narochnitskiy, 1956:73). 
But undoubtedly, too, Pim was correct in his suggestion, 
made  in his letter to Lady Franklin, that  through poor timing 
he may have ruffled Russian feathers. As we have seen, his 
proposal had been forwarded to St. Petersburg immediately 
after the tsar had  undertaken to maintain a careful watch along 
the arctic coast of Siberia for any traces of survivors of the 
Franklin expedition. Even Pim  himself conceded that  “he  was 
naturally irritated at the insinuations that his word  was  worth- 
less” (Pim, 185  1  b). 
The Mystery of Beatson’s Proposal 
Particularly baffling is the fact that  a simultaneous proposal 
for a parallel search expedition aimed at searching the same 
ground as Pim had  in mind but by sea rather than overland 
was received very warmly by the Russians. This was a pro- 
posal by a  private citizen, Donald  Beatson,  who  proposed  push- 
ing north through Bering Strait by sea  and  searching  the 
Siberian coast to the west.  Like Pim, he believed that  a  chain 
of  icebound  islands  extended  westwards  from  the  Parry 
Islands to the  general area of  Ostrov Vrangel’ya, that  an  open 
polar sea lay to the  north  of this barrier and that Erebus and 
Terror had become entangled in that chain of islands while 
trying to work their way south to Bering Strait (Beatson, 1852; 
Great Britain, 1852).  In  a letter to Sir Roderick  Murchison  that 
Murchison  read  at the meeting of the  Royal  Geographical 
Society on 12  January 1852, Beatson  reported  that the previ- 
ous October he  had  approached  Lady  Franklin  with his ideas 
and  with  a  proposal to search the area in question; not surpris- 
ingly she had  given  him every encouragement. 
On  that basis he had purchased  a schooner, Isabel, of just 
under 200 tons  and  was planning to equip it with steam power. 
With a  crew of 15 and provisions for 5 years, he planned to 
sail from England by the end of February 1852. Calling at 
Hawaii, he  hoped to reach Bering Strait by  mid- or late July. 
From there, depending on ice conditions, he planned to push 
due north, northeast or northwest. If forced to winter on  the 
Chukotka coast: 
I might  employ  the  spring  (before  the  breaking  up  of  the  ice)  in 
an  attempt  to  reach  that  land  seen by Captain  Kellett  from 
Herald  Island,  and  thus  be  enabled  to perform one  part  of  the 
scheme  proposed  by  Lieutenant  Pim. I would  next  in  the 
spring push away to the north and east, in which direction I 
believe I shall  eventually  find  some  traces  of our missing  ships 
[Beatson, 18521. 
Beatson received the support of the Royal Geographical 
Society and a subscription list was opened to help fund the 
project. It is  more surprising that, in  marked contrast to Pim’s 
plan, he received the blessing of the Admiralty, even to the 
extent of assistance in provisioning his ship (Stafford, 1852; 
Hamilton, 1852). And in even  greater contrast to Pim’s frus- 
trating experience is the fact that Tsar Nicholas offered his 
assistance to Beatson, providing him  with 
sealed  letters  to  the  Commandant of the  port  of  Petropavlovsk 
and  to  the  Director  of  the  Russian  American  Colonies  at  Sitka, 
and  an  open  letter  to  the  Russian  authorities  in  the  neighbour- 
hood of Behring’s  Straits,  which,  at  the  request  of  Her 
Majesty’s  Government,  the  Emperor  of  Russia  has  been 
pleased  to  allow  to be written,  enjoining  the  parties  to  whom 
they  are  addressed  to  exert  their  good  offices  in  favour  of 
Captain  Beatson’s  expedition.  The  Russian  Government  has, 
moreover, sent directly to the Russian authorities on the east 
coast  of  Siberia  and  on  the  north-west  coast  of  America, 
instructions  to  afford  Captain  Beatson  all  the  assistance  which 
it  may  be  in  the  power of those  authorities  to  render  him 
[Addington, 18521. 
What makes the tsar’s reaction to Beatson’s proposal  all  the 
more  baffling  is  that Petropavlovsk was  Russia’s  main Pacific 
naval  base,  which  would be the scene of a brief, bungled, but 
bloody siege by an Anglo-French squadron in  the summer of 
1854, during the Crimean War (Gough, 1971; Stone and 
Crampton, 1985). However, it should be noted  that Herald had 
called at Petropavlovsk several times during her cruises north 
to Bering Strait in search of Franklin (Seemann, 1853). One 
would  have thought, nonetheless, that  this  would  have  been  a 
much  more sensitive area than  the  arctic coasts Pim  proposed 
to search. 
Nevertheless Beatson’s expedition did  not  take place. Lack 
of funds and  what Sir Roderick  Murchison later described as 
“the unexpected personal embarrassments of the ingenious 
commander, to which it is  unnecessary  here to refer” (Murchi- 
son, 1852:lxxvi) forced the abandonment  of the project. 
Zronic Postscripts 
On his return to England Pim refunded the E300 that  Lady 
Franklin had provided to finance his trip (Pim, 1852). He 
immediately  volunteered to join Sir Edward Belcher’s squad- 
ron about to depart for the Arctic and  was aboard Resolute, 
Captain Henry Kellett, when she sailed with the rest of the 
squadron  from  the Thames on 22 April 1852 (Belcher, 1855; 
McDougall, 1857). It is particularly ironic, in view of Pim’s 
prediction in his first letter to the Admiralty (27 September 
1851)  that  the  expeditions  then  in  the  field  (including  M’Clure’s) 
“can only follow in the path and consequently incur a similar 
risk as Sir John Franklin” (Great Britain, 1852), that  the fol- 
lowing spring Pim played a key role in averting what came 
very close to a second major disaster. In fall 1852 a party  from 
Kellett’s  ships Resolute and Intrepid, wintering at Dealy 
Island, had found a note left by Captain Robert M’Clure  of 
Investigator to the effect that  he  was  wintering at Mercy  Bay 
on the  north coast of  Banks Island, this being  the  ship’s  third 
arctic  wintering in a row. In March 1853 Pim was selected to 
lead a sledge party across M’Clure Strait to make contact with 
M’Clure at Mercy Bay. He arrived there just in time, on 6 
April (Osborn, 1857; Neatby, 1967). M’Clure  intended to dis- 
patch  most of his men  overland  within  the  next  few  days, one 
party heading south via Prince of  Wales Strait to the  Macken- 
zie River, the other eastwards to Port Leopold  on  the northeast 
coast of Somerset  Island.  Some  idea of what  the  almost 
inevitable result of this plan  must  have  been may be gathered 
from  the fact that the first death  from  scurvy  among  M’Clure’s 
men  occurred  the  very  day after the  rescue  party  arrived. So, 
although  Pim’s  scheme  to  rescue  Franklin to the north of 
Chukotka came to naught, a year  later he  was  instrumental in 
averting a second  arctic disaster, since it is extremely unlikely 
that many of Investigator’s crew would have survived the 
man-hauling journeys M’Clure  was contemplating. 
Perhaps the greatest irony  of  the entire business of Pim’s 
proposal to mount a search for Franklin from Chukotka is  that 
in January 1854 he  was  appointed to the command of the gun- 
boat Magpie  (Dictionary of National  Biography, 1921-22), 
which  the following year  was attached to Rear-Admiral  Dun- 
das’s squadron in the Baltic campaign of the Crimean War. 
Hence Pim took part in the bombardment of the fortress of 
Suomenlinna (Sveaborg), which protects Helsinki  harbour,  on 
9 and 10 August 1855 (Bonner Smith, 1944) and was 
wounded in the process (Dictionary of National  Biography, 
1921-22). A month later (12 September) he commanded Mag- 
pie during a successful cutting-out operation in the Straits of 
Biorko in the  Gulf  of  Finland (Bonner Smith, 1944). Thus he 
made a minor contribution to the  ultimate defeat of Russia in 
the Crimean War. 
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